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I INTRODUCTION
Many modern constitutional charters of fundamental rights authorize the
limitation of the rights they entrench.1 The very abstract terms in which
constitutional rights are usually formulated make collisions among them,
and between different individuals’ entitlements under a single right,
inevitable. Naturally, this requires determination of the limits of rival
rights and of the entitlements they grant to individuals. It also seems to
render legislative and administrative determination of these rights
unobjectionable, provided that this is, as these constitutions require,
policed by independent courts – there are typically many different ways
in which clashing rights and interests might be reconciled in particular
circumstances, and it seems appropriate that in democracies the choice of
means should be left to an elected legislature and the government over
which it exercises ultimate control, while the courts ensure that the
choices so made remain within the broad framework of the charter of
rights.
However, modern constitutional law does not stop there. Apart from
providing for such ‘intrinsic’ limitations, it also authorizes ‘extrinsic’
limitations, that is, the limitation of fundamental rights on grounds that
do not directly appeal to the entrenched rights but rely on general
governmental goals, such as economic development, environmental
protection, the promotion of public health and effective policing. The
manner in which this is done varies from one jurisdiction to another,
being sometimes the product of judicial activity and at others expressly
provided for in the constitutional text. In the latter case, these grounds of
limitation can be contained in the statement of each of the enumerated
rights, or in a general limitations clause qualifying all rights – and there
are of course different ways in which these various techniques are
combined. The pertinent provision in the South African Constitution
illustrates the general nature and breadth of such permissible limitations
rather well:
*Associate Professor, Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town.
1 For a handy if by now somewhat dated survey, see Armand de Mestral et al (eds) The
Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (1986).
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‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited . . . to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justiﬁable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom . . .’2
Is this genuinely consistent with the nature of rights? Or does it go too far
to permit extrinsic as well as intrinsic limitations? Do these not take away
with one hand what charters of rights purport to give with the other?
Dworkin’s famous characterization of rights as trumps might be thought
to suggest as much. ‘If someone has a right to something,’ he wrote, ‘then
it is wrong for the Government to deny it to him even though it would
be in the general interest to do so’.3 And:
‘A right against the Government must be a right to do something even when
the majority thinks it would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority
would be worse off for having it done. If we now say that society has the right
to do whatever is in the general beneﬁt, or the right to preserve whatever sort
of environment the majority wishes to live in, and we mean that these are the
sort of rights that provide justiﬁcation for overruling any rights against the
Government that may conﬂict, then we have annihilated the latter rights.’4
Dworkin insists, however, that rights are not absolute: ‘Someone who
claims that citizens have a right against the Government need not go so
far as to say that the State is never justiﬁed in overriding that right.’5 He
recognizes that both intrinsic and extrinsic limitations may on occasion
be warranted, allowing for ‘the deﬁnition of a particular right’ to be
limited if otherwise ‘some competing right . . . would be abridged’ or
‘the cost to society . . . would be of a degree far beyond the cost paid to
grant the original right.’6
The crucial question then becomes how the courts ensure that the
choices that are made when rights clash with each other or with other
objectives remain true to the obligations imposed by fundamental rights.
When is it indeed legitimate, or, in the words used in the South African
Constitution, ‘reasonable and justiﬁable’, to limit a right? Several
jurisdictions have answered this question by stipulating a proportionality
test, also clearly articulated by the provision in the South African
Constitution quoted above, which requires the courts to take into
account:
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
2 Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
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(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
The balancing exercise involved in the application of the proportionality
test is staunchly defended by Robert Alexy in his analysis of the work of
the German Constitutional Court.7 Alexy relies on Dworkin’s account of
legal principles in order to show how a legal norm may on occasion be
outweighed by a competing consideration yet retain its validity. He
describes constitutional rights as having a ‘double aspect’: they are, in
Dworkin’s terminology, simultaneously principles and rules.8 This treats
constitutional rights as containing stipulations that are to varying degrees
incomplete, in that they do not, by themselves, enable the judicial
resolution of all disputes. In their dimension as principles, constitutional
rights function as ‘optimization requirements’, which means that each
right can, indeed must, be balanced against other optimization require-
ments, represented by competing rights as well as social values not
enshrined in rights.9 This contrasts with an approach that would resolve
conﬂicts between such competing norms by way of a ranking of values,
which Alexy rejects.10 He argues that the proportionality test, as the
embodiment of such a balancing exercise, ‘logically follows from the
nature of principles’.11 Alexy presents this test as designed to compare the
cost and beneﬁt of giving effect to a right and to bring about a balance
between the right and competing considerations in a manner that
optimizes the values on both sides of the conﬂict.12 He argues that this is a
rational and reﬂective process, involving characteristically legal judge-
ments of correctness and incorrectness, but acknowledges that there can
be uncertainties and reasonable disagreement in the determination of
what is a proportionate limitation, leading to a measure of undecidabil-
ity.13 It is the latter fact that creates the space for legislative discretion
within the framework of constitutional rights.
But Dworkin’s work has also been called in aid of the rejection of such
a balancing exercise as incompatible with a system of constitutional rights
and democratic decision-making. Jürgen Habermas insists that ‘as soon as
7 Robert Alexy A Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002).
8 Ibid chap 3.
9 Ibid 47–8. The statement in the text is a simpliﬁcation of Alexy’s argument – to the extent




12 Ibid 66–9. See also Robert Alexy ‘On balancing and subsumption. A structural
comparison’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433 at 436 ff.
13 Alexy (n 7) Postscript, especially 396ff. See also Robert Alexy ‘Constitutional rights,
balancing and rationality’ (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131.
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the deontological character of basic rights is taken seriously, they are
withdrawn from such cost-beneﬁt analysis’.14 In his view, an approach
such as Alexy’s wrongly treats rights as having ‘the teleological character
of a desirable good that we can achieve to a certain degree under the
given circumstances and within the horizon of our preferences’.15
Moreover, in keeping with his general emphasis on value pluralism and
the incommensurability of moral and ethical commitments, he denies
that there are rational standards by which the cost and beneﬁts of rights
can be measured. Any balancing exercise therefore ‘takes place either
arbitrarily or unreﬂectively’.16 Habermas takes the view that this ‘is one
reason why Dworkin regards rights as ‘‘trumps’’ ’.17 He sees the task of
resolving collisions of the kind we are considering as requiring of judges
‘to examine prima facie applicable norms in order to ﬁnd out which one
is most suitable to the case at hand’,18 ie as involving a selection among,
rather than a balancing of, norms. On Alexy’s approach, he warns, ‘the
constitutional court is transformed into an authoritarian agency’.19
It is a disconcerting suggestion that the balancing approach reﬂected in
the proportionality test serves to undermine democracy. At least at ﬁrst
sight, it is a technique designed to safeguard legislative power from
judicial colonization. In authorizing the limitation of rights, subject to its
being reasonable and justiﬁable, this approach appears to reconcile the
judicial protection of fundamental rights with due recognition of the
necessary and legitimate role played by the legislature in working out the
practical meaning of the charter of rights. But if Habermas is right, legal
theorists and practitioners need to re-think the direction that fundamen-
tal rights jurisprudence and practice has taken in several jurisdictions.
What exactly is involved in the limitation of rights is therefore a vital
question to investigate. And it is one for which Dworkin’s proliﬁc work
on the nature and place of rights in legal practice and theory is not only
useful, but also the natural starting point.
In what follows, I use Dworkin’s idea of rights as trumps in order to
identify two ways of taking rights seriously. The ﬁrst, which Dworkin
shares with Habermas, sees the issue as one of interpreting rights in order
to determine which right or value must be given effect to. This approach
seeks to resolve collisions among rights, and between rights and public
values that have not been sanctiﬁed as rights, by rendering the opposing
sides commensurable, thereby enabling the more important norm to be







158 THE PRACTICE OF INTEGRITY
identiﬁed and applied. According to the second approach, defended by
Alexy, the interpretation of rights does not provide a complete answer:
once it is clear that a conﬂict exists, the court must shift its attention to
optimizing the right in the face of factual and legal constraints, among
which feature other rights as well as non-right values. Instead of
attempting to select between the opposing values, this approach turns on
their reconciliation by way of a balanced, or ‘proportionate’, pursuit of
both.
I ﬁrst seek to explicate Dworkin’s idea of rights as trumps. This notion
has been explained and elaborated in many of his writings, spanning
several decades, and dealing with somewhat different issues. This part of
my essay is therefore reconstructive rather than purely descriptive in
tone, and is inevitably oriented towards pursuing the general question I
have identiﬁed. It is also critical, in that it shows that an approach such as
Dworkin’s is unable to deliver on its promise. I then investigate the
alternative conception, focusing in particular on whether it is compatible
with the idea that rights trump, that is, the deontic character of rights.
The general thesis that I advance is that the balancing of rights, as
explained and defended by Alexy, is not only legitimate, but also
necessary. I end with some reﬂections on the practical implications of this
conclusion.
II RIGHTS AS TRUMPS
What does it mean to say that constitutional rights are trumps? Dworkin
has several times explained what this means substantively, ie what and
when such rights trump.20 These explanations focus on the role played by
constitutional rights in inhibiting the unrestrained pursuit of the interests,
preferences and values of the majority of citizens. Constitutional rights
override other considerations, on this account, whenever this is necessary
to ensure that all citizens are treated with equality of concern and respect.
There is also an institutional dimension to this, which concerns the
constitutional implications of Dworkin’s theory of rights and provides a
justiﬁcation for allowing courts to trump the decisions of democratically
elected legislatures. This is especially relevant to the topic of this paper.
But there is a further question worth asking – what does it mean
conceptually: how do rights trump? I start by looking at the latter
question, postponing the ﬁrst two until later.
(1) How rights trump
Dworkin’s explanation of how constitutional rights trump seems to
distinguish between two types of collisions that a right might be involved
20 See especially Ronald Dworkin (n 3); A Matter of Principle (1985); Freedom’s Law (1996);
Sovereign Virtue (2000) Part II.
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in. The ﬁrst concerns collisions with competing individual rights: ‘a
competing right to protection . . . must be weighed against an individual
right to act’.21 This, he indicates, presents no particular problem:
‘The individual rights that our society acknowledges often conﬂict . . . and
when they do it is the job of Government to discriminate. If the Government
makes the right choice, and protects the more important at the cost of the less,
then it has not weakened or cheapened the notion of a right; on the contrary
it would have done so had it failed to protect the more important of the
two.’22
This description of how the government is to make the right choice
points to how the conception of rights as trumps affects the resolution of
conﬂicts among rights – ‘[i]f rights make sense, then the degrees of their
importance cannot be so different that some count not at all when others
are mentioned’.23 That a particular right exists thus means that it cannot
be ignored, that it must count for something. What determines how
much a right must count and whether ‘the Government makes the right
choice’ is a question I discuss below. For the present I want to point out
that this is simply an instantiation of Dworkin’s general formulation of
what it means to take rights seriously, which is encapsulated in his
contention that we cannot ‘say that the Government is justiﬁed in
overriding a right on the minimal grounds that would be sufficient if no
such right existed’.24
That this is what treating rights as trumps amounts to is equally clear in
Dworkin’s treatment of the second type of collision that rights may be
involved in. This concerns clashes with objectives that have not been
accorded the status of rights, typically (although not necessarily) the
preferences, convictions or interests of the majority of citizens. In this
case, we must ‘set aside talk of balancing as inappropriate’.25 In his view,
‘[i]t cannot be an argument for curtailing a right, once granted, that society
would pay a further price for extending it. There must be something special
about that further cost, or there must be some other feature of the case, that
makes it sensible to say that although great social cost is warranted to protect
the original right, this particular cost is not necessary.’26
But what provides the metric of these measurements? How does one go
about determining the relative importance of a right compared to other
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rights or the social cost imposed by its protection? Dworkin’s answer is
that ‘once a right is recognized in clear-cut cases, then the Government
should act to cut off that right only when some compelling reason is
presented, some reason that is consistent with the suppositions on which
the original right must be based’.27 And the suppositions to which this
refers us are, it seems, that the right serves to secure the dignity and
equality of individuals, or, as Dworkin also puts it, equality of concern
and respect.
The necessity of investigating the connection between, on the one
hand, particular rights, such as the right to free speech or the right not to
be discriminated against on grounds such as race or gender, and, on the
other hand, the pursuit of equality of concern and respect, has indeed
often been stressed by Dworkin in his discussion of issues such as the
banning of pornography, prohibition of abortions, and affirmative
action.28 In each case his analysis focuses on whether and how a particular
right serves to secure equality of concern and respect, and seeks to show
how a particular limitation of a right either jeopardizes this (prohibition
of pornography or abortion) or is compatible with its pursuit (affirmative
action programmes). In his more recent work he articulates this by
speaking of ‘the principle of victimization’.29
The general structure of his argument is clear from the following
response to those who would restrict someone’s freedom of expression
on the ground that provocative public statements might incite riots that
end in the violation of the rights of others. After stressing the connection
between expression and dignity, Dworkin observes that,
‘If . . . forbidding him to speak, does the damage that . . . the right of free
speech assume[s], then it would be contemptuous for the State to tell a man
that he must suffer this damage against the possibility that other men’s loss may
be marginally reduced.’30
This example concerns competing individual rights. What, then, of
collisions between rights and non-right considerations? What would
make it, in Dworkin’s words, ‘sensible to say that although great social
cost is warranted to protect the original right, this particular cost [of
27 Ibid.
28 See the works cited in note 20.
29 Dworkin Sovereign Virtue (n 20) 175. The argument in this work has a slightly different
nuance from the earlier statement of his position which I draw upon here, as it depicts conﬂicts
between rights as contingent upon the imperfections of the ‘real real world’ rather than
essential, and treats the limitation of rights as serving the cause of moving society towards an
ideal world of perfect equality where such conﬂict would be absent. See 172–183. In my view
nothing turns on this difference between the later and the earlier arguments.
30 Dworkin (n 3) 203.
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sacriﬁcing a competing social goal] is not necessary’31 so that one may
justiﬁably pursue that goal? The answer is that when collisions of this
second type occur, the limitation of a right is legitimate only if the
inclusion of a particular case within the scope of that right – for example,
inclusion of the ritual smoking of marijuana by Rastafarians under the
right to religious freedom – would impose a social cost that ‘would not
simply be incremental, but would be of a degree far beyond the cost paid
to grant the original right’.32 The distinction again turns on the
protection of dignity and equality, or equality of concern and respect.
Where cost to society is in play, Dworkin tells us, that cost must be of ‘a
degree great enough to justify whatever assault on dignity and equality
might be involved’.33 This is so, because the beneﬁt brought to society by
the institution of rights is that ‘it represents the majority’s promise to the
minorities that their dignity and equality will be respected’.34
The views expressed in these quotations seem to occupy a middle
ground between Habermas’s and Alexy’s positions. Like Habermas,
Dworkin insists that the articulation of a norm as a right withdraws the
norm from ordinary cost-beneﬁt analysis. Dworkin therefore has
something more in mind than, as Raz charged, the truisms that rights
make a difference and may defeat other considerations.35 They make a
difference of a special kind, in Dworkin’s view, one which reﬂects their
deontological character and directs the inquiry to determining the right
choice, not merely the most efficient or convenient one. In these
quotations rights are treated as enjoying a special status compared to
non-right considerations: while the relative importance of two colliding
rights may be weighed up, there ‘must be something special’ about the
cost that a right would impose on such other considerations. However,
cost-beneﬁt analysis is not entirely excluded when rights are in play. A
right that is too costly by virtue of its impact in the circumstances of the
case either on another right or on social interests may be curtailed. And
this appears entirely compatible with Alexy’s idea that rights must be
reconciled as far as possible with each other as well as with important
public purposes by way of a proportionality test.
Dworkin opens up this apparent middle ground by treating social
values and interests as having a dual role. On the one hand, they operate
on the same plane as constitutional rights and may therefore potentially
come into conﬂict with them. On the other hand, however, social values
and interests operate at a different, more fundamental level than
31 Ibid 200.
32 Ibid. This example is based on Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid 205.
35 Joseph Raz ‘Professor Dworkin’s theory of rights’ (1979) 26 Political Studies 123 at 126.
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constitutional rights. They are present at their birth, determining which
values will be sanctiﬁed as rights in a given society.
Assigning rights such a dual role is made possible by a distinction he
draws between ‘institutional rights’, which include constitutional and
other legal rights, and ‘background’ rights.36 The former, which may vary
among societies and over time, are crystallizations of the latter: they
express a particular political community’s vision of how to pursue justice
and fairness and other social objectives and values.37 It is in respect of
these that Dworkin says that, if ‘someone has a right to do something, . . .
it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it would be
in the general interest to do so’.38 At the deeper level where the rights are
settled upon, however, public interests and values play a decisive role in
that they constitute the goals of the political community, and hence
establish the rights that express those goals in an individuated form.39
This does treat rights as deontic in the manner sought by Habermas.
However, Dworkin does not, as Raz would have it, ‘claim that rights
cannot be defeated by considerations of the general interest or by other
considerations’.40 The trump-theory of rights accepts that compelling
reasons consistent with the supposition underlying the original right may
curtail the right. Thus Dworkin says that the ‘strength of any particular
right, within a particular theory [of justice in a given society] is a function
of the degree of disservice to the goals of the theory . . . that is necessary
to justify refusing an act called for under the right’.41 In other words,
although the right is withdrawn from ordinary cost-beneﬁt analysis, its
rootedness in these underlying considerations provides a legitimate
metric for reconciling the demands of clashing rights and non-right
considerations. This means that while Dworkin, along with Habermas,
denies that rights may be subjected to ordinary cost-beneﬁt analysis, he
nevertheless endorses a special form thereof. However, the apparent
similarity between this and the proportionality test defended by Alexy is
deceptive, for Dworkin’s approach entails not a balancing but a ranking
of clashing considerations, on the basis of their respective contributions
to the pursuit of equal concern and respect.
(2) The content-independent value of rights
In Dworkin’s account, if a speciﬁc consideration – eg freedom of religion
– is conceptualised as a right, then something more has to be added on
36 Dworkin (n 3) 93–4. See also his reply to Raz, ibid 364–8.
37 This idea is present throughout his work. See especially Dworkin Freedom’s Law (n 20)
Introduction; and Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire (1986).
38 Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (n 3) 269.
39 Ibid.
40 Raz (n 35) 126.
41 Dworkin (n 3) 169–70.
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the other side of the scale than would have been the case if that selfsame
consideration had not taken the shape of a right. Merely by virtue of
being recognised as a right that consideration has extra weight when it is
placed in the scale against non-right considerations. This is why
utilitarian arguments, which seek only to balance the beneﬁt of giving
effect to the content of right against the cost of doing so, are in his view
‘ruled out by the concept of rights’,42 while the relative importance of
colliding rights may legitimately be weighed up. This treats a right as
having a kind of double value, deriving in part from its content and partly
from its structure. In keeping with this one could say that the
content-independent structural value is cancelled out when rights
collide, leaving only their content values to be compared, but comes into
its own when a right collides with a non-right.
Whence this content-independent value? Answering this brings us
back to what I have referred to as the deeper level where the
constitutional rights are settled upon, to the suppositions underlying the
rights recognized. The interests and values of a given society do more
than determine which goals are to be cast as rights. They also determine
whether goals should be cast as rights at all, that is, whether the institution
of constitutional rights should feature in that society’s methods for
making public decisions. Dworkin’s writings propose that the speciﬁc
social goal that underlies the existence of the institution of rights is
equality of concern and respect.
The content-independent value of constitutional rights therefore
derives from a special connection between these rights and the goal of
respecting the dignity and equality of all members of society by treating
them with respect and concern. Dworkin has of course repeatedly
emphasized this. An early form of this argument is his attempt to show
that a system of rights is essential to ensuring that the pursuit of the
collective good, if conceived along utilitiarian lines as the maximisation
of individual preference-satisfaction, treats every member of society as an
equal.43 More recently it has taken the shape of a general explanation of
the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation in a constitutional
democracy.44 One aspect of this is a demonstration of how pure or
statistical majoritarianism, in which an electoral majority freely pursues its
own interests and convictions, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
existence of a democratic state; another, equally important, is an
explanation of the limits of judicial power. Both turn on the idea of
‘choice-sensitive decisions’, that is, on the idea that there are some, but
42 Ibid 203.
43 Ibid 275–7.
44 See Dworkin Freedom’s Law (n 20) Introduction; A Matter of Principle (n 20) 33–71;
Sovereign Virtue (n 20) 203–10.
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only some, decisions the correctness of which depends on choice. On
this view, the exercise of judicial power, which is structured in a manner
that does not lend itself to the summation and application of preferences,
is both necessary and legitimate whenever, but only to the extent that, it
involves decisions that are not choice-sensitive, that is, decisions which
apply rights. Since Dworkin takes the view that this requires recourse to
the ideal of equal concern and respect, constitutional review serves to
safeguard equality understood in this way.
This, then, is what it means for legal or constitutional rights to be
Dworkinian trumps: they have a special content-independent structural
value but also limits by virtue of their role in safeguarding equality of
concern and respect. Every such right has a weight that reﬂects not only
the importance of its content, but also the value of the institution of
rights. The content and structure of rights are linked because the reach of
a right, ie its practical implications for a given situation, depends on how
its content-independent value is best given effect to in the circumstances
of the case. That is, the content of the right is treated by Dworkin as a
particular instantiation of the general structural purpose of all legal rights.
These two dimensions of rights are nevertheless distinct, as they can
come apart – in discussing ‘evil legal systems’ Dworkin has argued that
equality of concern and respect may support the enforcement of rights
with an ‘acceptable’ content even though the society’s system of legal
rights as a whole may be inimical to this value.45 However, he sees such
situations as pathological – the central case of legal rights is that in which
the content of each right as well as the institution of rights aims at
safeguarding equality of concern and respect.
We now know what Dworkin’s understanding of how rights are taken
seriously means conceptually as well as substantively. Conceptually it
means that, although rights are not absolute, conﬂicting objectives may
only be acted upon if doing so is compatible with the underlying
rationale of the right. That is, it means that rights override clashing
considerations, whether these are cast in the shape of rights or not, in
order to safeguard the background justiﬁcations of which they are
intermediate generalizations. Since the underlying rationale of all rights is
to ensure that all citizens are treated with equal respect and concern, its
substantive meaning is that only objectives which treat all citizens equally
in this way are permissible. Rights trump because, and when, this
promotes equality of concern and respect.
It is vital to note that this drives a wedge between rights and goals not
sanctiﬁed as rights. All rights enjoy this special content-independent
value, but no social goals do. Since these do not necessarily conﬂict with
45 Dworkin Law’s Empire (n 37) 105–8 and 218–9.
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rights,46 they may on occasion also serve this cause, but whether they do
so is content dependent. Nevertheless, in light of the decisive role
accorded to equality of concern and respect in resolving both types of
collision examined so far, it seems clear that taking rights seriously in the
Dworkinian manner does not in fact require of one to distinguish
between clashes among rights and clashes between rights and non-right
goals. The symmetry between these two situations means that nothing is
gained by the adoption of different descriptions of what happens in the
case of these two kinds of collisions. In both cases countervailing goals are
ranked by means of the metric supplied by equality of concern and
respect.
III EQUALITY OF CONCERN AND RESPECT
We have now laid the groundwork for ﬁnding the answer to the
questions that the debate between Habermas and Alexy led us to. Does
equality of concern and respect provide a non-arbitrary metric for
employing the proportionality test? Can it enable one to distinguish
between permissible and impermissible limitations of rights? And does it
show how balancing rights and goals in this way can remain true to the
deontic character of rights? Can it, in other words, enable rights to trump
and courts to ensure that they do so? I shall argue that equality of concern
and respect cannot do the work expected of it: it lacks the ability to
discriminate between permissible and impermissible curtailments of
rights, it is not suited to resolving the issues it is meant to address, and it is
based on a mistaken view of the social role of rights. My argument in this
section therefore focuses on three fatal ﬂaws of equality of concern and
respect when used to weigh rights against each other and against other
considerations.
(1) The ability to discriminate
Let us then ﬁrst focus on Dworkin’s view that equality of concern and
respect rules out restricting rights on the ground of collective interests
such as efficiency and administrative expense. According to Dworkin,
rights usually trump countervailing collective interests, such as minimiz-
ing the cost of enforcement, and aggregated preferences in order to
ensure that minorities are treated with equality of concern and respect.
Why should such matters not count? What provides the distinction
between unacceptable grounds for limiting rights and acceptable ones?
Does equality of concern and respect explain the distinction Dworkin
46 This is the implication of both his earlier view that constitutional rights can cure
utilitarian decision-making of its defects and his later endorsement of collective decision-
making processes in the case of choice-sensitive matters.
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seeks to draw between different collective interests?47 This is an
important question, partly because courts, in several jurisdictions, have
on occasion followed a different line from that suggested by Dworkin and
have indeed limited rights in the interest of administrative and ﬁnancial
efficiency.48
We should begin by noting that there are two senses in which interests
might be said to be collective. The ﬁrst sense is that of interests
representing a collectively determined choice or preference. Utilitarian-
ism pursues collective interests of this kind, and so does a political system
in which decisions are based only on what the majority deems right or in
its interest. Examples of collective interests of this kind would be the
promotion and protection of a religion held dear by the majority of a
country’s citizens, or its mirror image, the promotion of secularism. But
many interests are ‘collective’ in a different sense – they are in the interest
of every member of society whatever their preferences or values might
be. One example of this is minimizing enforcement costs, which
Dworkin rejects as a legitimate ground for curtailing rights49 – by freeing
up resources, this enables the pursuit of a wider range of policies,
whatever these might be, and in doing so also potentially beneﬁts those
whose rights are being curtailed. In fact, there are many collective
interests of this kind. Obvious examples are freedom of belief; the
improvement of everyone’s standard of living; the promotion of social
integration; the existence of a functioning police and criminal justice
system; opportunities for individual self-development, intellectual, cul-
tural, spiritual and physical; the existence of a healthy and pleasant
environment; a minimum level of healthcare, education, welfare for
everyone; the functioning of the military and of industrial enterprises; an
effective system of state administration governed through a political
system characterised by democratic participation and the framework of
civic liberties that this necessitates, and so on. Many, but not all, of these
have been entrenched as constitutional rights, and there are signiﬁcant
differences among countries in this regard. Yet they all, irrespective of
their constitutional status, serve the interest of individual members of
society, jointly and severally.
Dworkin’s description of how rights trump elides this distinction. His
explanation of how and why rights exclude collective interests treats
47 His suggestion at one point that it is a matter of the degree of interference (see text above
to n 33) doesn’t take us very far because it begs the question of the scale on which such degrees
are to be plotted.
48 See eg the German Constitutional Court’s decision BVerfGE 77, 84 and that of its South
African counterpart in Prince v President, Cape Law Society (n 32), in both of which the
avoidance of excessive policing costs was treated as a legitimate ground for limiting a
constitutional right.
49 Dworkin (n 3) 201, 203.
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collective interests of the second type as if they belonged to the former.
But there is more to pointing this out than simply revealing Dworkin’s
failure to appreciate the true character of some of the collective goals
treated by him as incompatible with taking rights seriously. Its true
signiﬁcance is that it serves as a reminder that collective interests can be
perfectly compatible with showing equality of concern and respect.
Three implications for dealing with clashes between rights and
collective interests ﬂow from this. To begin with, this means that a
distinction can indeed be drawn among collective interests according to
their relationship to this conception of equality. However, it also means
that there is often no principled reason why a particular consideration
falls into the category of rights or not. This makes the special status
accorded to rights look arbitrary. Finally, it follows that, as Raz has put it,
‘it is impossible to insert a conceptual wedge between rights and
collective goals in the way Dworkin has chosen’50 – both can promote
equality of concern and respect. Thus, although equality of concern and
respect may enable us to discriminate among collective interests, it fails to
mark them off from rights. In consequence, the idea that rights serve the
cause of equality of concern and respect is not going to help resolve
conﬂicts with countervailing collective goals.
While Dworkin’s work provides answers to both of these apparent
dilemmas, the answers still fail to justify the content-independent value
he attributes to rights. His emphasis on the role that political rights play in
maintaining particular political communities’ speciﬁc background com-
mitments, their own particular, characteristic ways of pursuing equality
of concern and respect, refutes the charge of arbitrariness.51 Once rights
are seen as playing this role of maintaining the integrity of a community’s
conception of justice, the special status they enjoy in comparison with
other means for pursuing equality of concern and respect no longer
appears arbitrary. Raz’s charge is met by Dworkin’s acceptance of the
possibility that collective goals can on occasion legitimately curtail rights.
It is true that Dworkin has often written that rights exclude collective
goals, and that many of those he mentions fall into the second group of
collective goals identiﬁed above. But it seems best to regard these
statements as over-hasty and inexact formulations and to pass them over,
for his description of how rights trump also acknowledges that allowing
collective goals to override rights can sometimes be compatible with
equality of concern and respect.52
However, Raz’s comment also casts doubt over the special, content-
independent structural value that Dworkin accords to rights. This is a
50 Raz (n 35) 128.
51 See the works cited in notes 20 and 37.
52 See the remarks quoted in the text above to notes 31 to 33.
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point that neither of these answers addresses. If aims that have not been
given the form of rights are also means for pursuing equality of concern
and respect, then there seems to be no special relationship between rights
and this form of equality, and hence no apparent reason why rights, as a
class, should be thought of as having a special content-independent value.
True, treating rights as rights – that is, letting them trump – promotes the
consistent and coherent decision-making that is articulated in Dworkin’s
notion of integrity and thus ensures that all citizens are treated equally,53
but this is not a peculiarity of rights: the same result would be achieved by
treating any non-right goal in this way. Moreover, once we recall that
both conﬂicts among rights and conﬂicts between rights and other goals
must in Dworkin’s view be resolved by having recourse to equality of
concern and respect, it is clear that in the ﬁnal analysis nothing turns on
whether a particular goal is called a right. The idea that it is the
promotion of equality of concern and respect that accounts for the special
content-independent value of rights dissolves, rather than hardens, the
deontic character of rights.
In other words, although Dworkin’s explanation of the virtue of
integrity shows why treating rights as trumps promotes equality of
concern and respect, it does not show why only rights should be treated in
this way and thus be allowed to trump other aims which, as we have seen,
also often serve the cause of equality of concern and respect. The fact that
a consideration is classiﬁed as a right therefore does not seem to produce
the special content-independent value Dworkin claims for it. Why
should it be thought worse to apply the goal of maximising law-
enforcement efficiency consistently even if it curtails the rights of
suspects, than to protect their rights at the cost of having a police force
that is less efficient at combating crime to the beneﬁt of all, including
those who suffer at its hands? There is an answer to this, but equality of
concern and respect cannot provide that answer as it is present on both
sides of the scale.
This inability to discriminate between rights and collective goals is a
serious matter, for it goes to the heart of the appeal of equality of concern
and respect. Its appeal lies in the promise it holds out to individuals of
protection against collective religious and cultural practices, whether of
the majority or of sub-groups to which those individuals might belong. If
it is the case that, as many have argued, such collective practices are a
social good of the second type in as much as their presence in society is
53 For his theory of law as integrity and its connection with equality, see Dworkin Law’s
Empire (n 37).
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essential to the development of individuals,54 then equality of concern
and respect pulls in both directions.
Moreover, that equality of concern ultimately fails to explain why a
legal right operates as a trump over collective goals suggests that the real
reason for a right’s power lies in a decision by the political community in
which it operates to accord higher status to the value enshrined in that
right than to others, and not in any content-independent reason. It is
only on the basis of such a choice that one can explain, for example, why
the interests of suspects and the innocent are in many societies allowed to
trump the interest of all citizens in efficient and effective law enforce-
ment. Importantly, there is no a priori reason for thinking that this choice
would always be designed to protect individuals or minorities. Hence the
mere choice by a society to endow a particular value with the status of a
legal right cannot in itself justify its treatment as a trump. This raises the
question whether the necessary further justiﬁcation can be found in
equality of concern and respect. Can the latter, even if it is not sufficient
to explain why rights trump, at least help to explain it by showing why
and when it is justiﬁable to give effect to a society’s choice of rights?
(2) Transposing the obligations of individuals onto social institutions
The short answer to the question just asked is no. The reason is to be
found in the second way in which Dworkin’s conception of rights as
trumps fails. This is that it mistakenly applies a measure that is appropriate
to the evaluation of the conduct of individuals to the evaluation of social
institutions.
The phrase equality of concern and respect signals that people are
entitled to have their status as moral agents of intrinsic worth, their moral
dignity, recognised. This is, of course, a restatement of Kant’s categorical
imperative that in its famous Kingdom of Ends formulation enjoins us to
act only on principles which could be accepted by other members of a
community of fully rational agents who share equally in legislating the
principles for their community, and Dworkin indeed presents his
approach as inspired by Kant.55 Dworkin believes that this precludes the
state from prescribing any particular vision of human ﬂourishing to its
citizens, although he correctly emphasizes that this does not amount to
the view that the state should be morally neutral.56
54 See eg Joseph Raz ‘Multiculturalism’ (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 193 at 200; KAnthonyAppiah
‘Identity, authenticity, survival’ in Charles Taylor et al Multiculturalism (1994) 149.
55 Dworkin (n 3) 198. Kant’s formulation referred to here is particularly close to Dworkin’s
‘principle of abstraction’while his principles of ‘authenticity’ and of ‘independence’ are equally
Kantian in inspiration. See Sovereign Virtue (n 20) 147–62.
56 See especially Ronald Dworkin Life’s Dominion (1993) 166–8.
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Now, Kant directed this injunction at individuals, telling each of us
how we must treat others, given the understanding that each of us has of
what constitutes a worthwhile human life, that is, given our personal
conceptions of the good. Dworkin transposes this from the level of
individual behaviour to that of social institutions such as the state, and
there’s the rub. He endorses ‘a particularly deep personiﬁcation of the
community or state’, which ‘attributes moral agency and responsibility to
this distinct entity’.57 The extent of this transposition may nevertheless
not be immediately obvious, as he portrays the duty of the state to treat
citizens with equal concern and respect as the product of the duties
individuals owe each other by virtue of their common membership of
the community.58 However, it will not do to depict the state as merely an
avenue by which individuals severally pursue the Kantian injunction.
Whenever a social controversy arises that seems to call for the state to
show equality of concern and respect there will a fortiori be different
individual views of the good, each of which is compatible with the
Kantian injunction and may therefore be legitimately pressed on the state
by those who hold them. This is so because the categorical imperative
does not require of individuals to abandon or compromise their
conceptions of the good when others disagree with them, but merely to
ensure that they treat others as autonomous moral agents given their own
conceptions of the good. To put the same point in somewhat different
terms: the categorical imperative requires that individuals treat each other
as equals, not that they treat each other’s conceptions of the good as
equal. The upshot is that social institutions that function in the face of
such disagreement can only do so on the basis of principles that are
selected by way of a procedure that is distinct from that by which their
members settle on their various conceptions of the good.59 If the state
owes its citizens equal concern and respect then its duties cannot be
merely derivative from those of its citizens but must be truly its own.
The reason why it matters that Dworkin’s approach transposes Kant’s
injunction onto social institutions is this. To treat someone with respect is
to give that person his or her due. In other words, to fulﬁl this injunction
it is necessary to know what respect requires, what treatment is due to
persons. Does respect require concern with the salvation of another’s
57 Dworkin Law’s Empire (n 37) 167–8.
58 This can be seen in all his recent work, including Dworkin Law’s Empire (n 37) 167–75,
but is perhaps most obvious in Sovereign Virtue (n 20), especially in its explanation of equality by
means of a reﬂection on how shipwreck survivors washed up on an island would go about
settling fundamental questions of justice. Note that my argument in the following paragraphs
would be strengthened if I am wrong about this.
59 This is reﬂected in the structure and operation of social institutions such as legislatures and
courts, as they enable public officials to decide matters on the basis of convictions that might
differ from those held by citizens.
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soul, or leaving others to their own religious devices? Does it mean that
their religious, sexual or cultural commitments must receive the same
protection as, or indeed special protection over and above that accorded
to, their aesthetic, sporting, professional or ﬁnancial interests? Does it
mean that people should be held to their contractual undertakings or that
they should be relieved of these when they turn out to be exploitative?
Questions like these only have to be posed for it to be clear that the
requirements of respectful behaviour are closely interwoven with speciﬁc
views of what constitutes a ﬂourishing, worthwhile, digniﬁed life.
Importantly, this cannot be evaded by substituting notions such as moral
autonomy or authenticity for respect, as these invite similar questions.
Respect, autonomy, authenticity, concern, and comparable notions have
to be ﬂeshed out with a conception of human ﬂourishing before they can
have any purchase. Anything less would offer only the truism that moral
agents are entitled to be treated as moral agents. Morality is dependent on
ethics.60
This is not peculiar to the pursuit of equality of concern and respect at
the level of social institutions. Individual compliance with Kant’s
injunction also relies on a pre-existing notion of what is important to and
about humans. But at the level of individual conduct the categorical
imperative refers back to how someone believes people should be treated
by others, and its satisfaction requires no more than keeping faith with
that person’s own conception of human ﬂourishing. When we move
away from interactions among individuals, however, and seek to apply it
to how social institutions should act, then it begs rather than answers the
question it is meant to address. If the state is to pursue equality of concern
and respect, then it must, like each individual separately, decide what is
intrinsically valuable and important about humans – yet this is precisely
what is in issue in the contexts where equality of concern and respect is
meant to guide collective decisions.61
Moreover, while individuals can refer back to their own conception of
the good, the state has none to refer to. Social institutions are not persons;
despite Dworkin’s claim to the contrary, the state is not a moral agent in
its own right with its own interests and ethics. This means that the
problem does not disappear with acknowledgement that social institu-
tions are inevitably faced with moral or ethical questions when
determining what equal treatment requires. In deciding what is intrinsi-
cally valuable and important about humans, social institutions cannot
60 I use Dworkin’s terminology in Sovereign Virtue (n 20) 485 fn 1: ‘Ethics . . . includes
convictions about which kinds of lives are good or bad for a person to lead, and morality
includes principles about how a person should treat other people.’
61 Good examples are afforded by the arguments in the South African cases on the
criminalization of gay sex (National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice
1999 (1) SA 6 (CC)) and prostitution (S v Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC)).
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avoid selecting an ethical conception that ‘belongs’ to some of their
members but not to others, satisfying some and frustrating others, for
there is no conception that is an institution’s own (and which could
therefore provide an impartial perspective) rather than that of some actual
moral agent. Thus, whenever a situation arises that appears to call for
equality of concern and respect, a social institution is confronted with a
question that individuals, who can justify their pursuit of one ethical
conception rather than another with reference to their own moral
agency, do not have to face. And in dealing with this question the
Kantian injunction, which is dependent on a logically (but not morally)
prior conception of human ﬂourishing, offers no help.
It is worth emphasizing that this criticism of equality of concern and
respect does not entail a rejection of respect for human dignity and
autonomy as a guiding light for public policy. It merely asserts that this
principle cannot dispose of an issue that turns on the question whether a
particular conception of dignity, autonomy and so forth should be
respected or whether a particular impact counts as harm, which is
precisely the type of issue in respect of which equality of concern and
respect is meant to do its work. Nor does it reject pursuit of the ideal of a
pluralistic and tolerant society that Dworkin’s notion of equality is
designed to advance. Its message is only that this notion is inadequate to
that task.
The argument so far has several important implications for the theme
of this essay. In the ﬁrst place, it means that it is a mistake to restrict the
role of rights to the pursuit of equality of concern and respect. Even if
one accepts that legal rights should play this role – which is queried in the
next section – this can be but one aspect of rights. They at least also
promote a vision of what is a good life. While this broader role is
certainly compatible with the pursuit of a pluralistic and tolerant society
of the kind Dworkin seeks to safeguard through the idea of equality of
concern and respect, it does mean – and this is the second implication –
that this idea does not furnish a workable criterion for balancing
countervailing considerations when rights conﬂict with each other and
with non-right goals and values. Whenever rights have the occasion to
trump, equality of concern and respect begs rather than answers the
question whether a communal goal that is being pressed on the state by
some of its citizens should be protected or overridden. Finally, this means
that equality of concern and respect cannot show why and when it is
justiﬁable to give effect to a society’s choice of rights. To do so, it is
necessary to provide a substantive defence of the conception of a good
and worthwhile human life reﬂected in its array of rights that goes well
beyond the truism that moral agents are entitled to be treated as moral
agents.
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(3) The content-independent value of rights
Why should equality of concern and respect ﬁgure at all in the resolution
of collisions among rights and with non-right goals? Why should
constitutional rights, in trumping considerations that clash with them, do
so in order to protect equality of concern and respect?
Dworkin’s argument ties the answer to the cost of rights. He insists that
the institution of rights imposes a signiﬁcant social cost, that is, that
society pays a price for having rights, independently of their content.62 If
rights deserve being taken seriously, then it must be the case, he argues,
that the very institution of rights is valuable to society. Since a system of
rights imposes social costs, its existence can be justiﬁed only if it
contributes something to society – equality of concern and respect – that
counterbalances such costs. This is why he treats rights as a having the
special content-independent value that he ﬁnds in the protection that the
institution of rights gives to equality of concern and respect. In other
words, it is his view that rights as a class must be understood as serving to
protect equality of concern and respect because it is only when they do
this that their social impact is justiﬁed.
One might think that this cost ﬂows from the way in which rights
constrain democratically elected governments and limit individuals’
pursuit of their ethical commitments. But much of Dworkin’s work is
taken up with denying that rights do so. He argues that rights in fact serve
the cause of democracy by ensuring that citizens have an equal voice and
equal stake in social decisions and that these respect their moral
independence.63 And he puts forward the view that justice – ie equality
of concern and respect – is ‘constitutive of ethics’, that is, that leading a
good life is not merely a matter of living well in the world as it is, but also
involves making the world a more just place.64
However, these arguments undercut the idea that rights impose a
content-independent cost. If rights are essential to democracy, and justice
is to ethics, then the institution of rights imposes no cost as such.
Everything then turns on the content of the rights: do they provide
equality of voice and of stake and moral independence, and do they
conform to the requirements of justice? Likewise, the beneﬁts of a system
of rights then become content-dependent. There is consequently no
longer any reason for regarding rights as a special class of considerations
that are characterized by a content-independent value that justiﬁes
treating them as trumps. It follows that even if one agrees with Dworkin
that rights, uniquely, serve the cause of equality of concern and respect –
62 See Dworkin (n 3) 193, 198.
63 Ronald Dworkin ‘Equality, democracy, and constitution: We the people in court’ (1990)
28 Alberta LR 324.
64 See Sovereign Virtue (n 20) 260–7.
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a belief that I argued against above – the cost and value of the institution
of rights have yet to be identiﬁed.
This is not intended to deny that the institution of rights is associated
with constraints on autonomy, whether social or individual. It is. But it is
not rights as such that impose this cost. We should therefore look
elsewhere. Now, Dworkin’s arguments focus on the role and value of
rights rather than on their instantiation as legal rights – that is, the legal
enforcement of rights is justiﬁed by him through a defence of rights
rather than a defence of their legal enforcement. This treats their legal
status as contingent rather than essential: other mechanisms for ensuring
voice, stake and independence and for pursuing justice – for example
unforced self-constraint on the part of citizens in pursuing their ideals –
would also serve the cause of democracy and ethics.
The place to look for the missing content-independent cost and
beneﬁt of rights is therefore in the implications of the speciﬁcally legal
institutionalisation of rights. These implications are as follows. Wherever
there are legal rights, there of necessity also exist legal institutions that are
accepted as having the authority to determine and apply such rights.
Their authority may of course be legitimate, and it is tempting to think
that this means that the existence of speciﬁcally legal rights no more
imposes costs on individual and social autonomy than do rights as such.
But that conclusion would be too quick.
To see why this is so, it is necessary to note two features of legal rights.
First, legal rights apply generally, that is, to all who ﬁnd themselves within
the legal system’s jurisdiction irrespective of whether these rights
conform to the ethical and moral ideals or obligations of those to whom
they apply.65 Secondly, because legal rights are institutional rights they
may nevertheless still be legitimate, as there may be good reason,
including for those whose ideals and obligations are sacriﬁced, to support
and maintain the existing legal institutions. For example, the fact that a
particular legal system achieves a better balance than others between the
degree of sacriﬁce imposed on some of its subjects’ pursuit of the good
and the satisfaction of their material needs, or supplies protection against
demands for even greater sacriﬁce, or provides opportunities for ﬁghting
to reduce or eliminate such sacriﬁces, or even that it safeguards physical
survival in a hostile world, and most importantly that it creates a social
context essential for the formation of individual identity – all these
features may, depending on the circumstances, render a given system of
legal rights legitimate even in respect of those who are committed to and
morally or ethically bound by an array of rights that diverges from that
65 The formulation of this sentence is meant to refer to situations of moral pluralism where
equally valid yet incompatible and incommensurate conceptions vie with each other, and to
avoid the trap of moral subjectivism and relativism.
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endorsed by the legal system. Hence, unlike moral rights, legal rights can,
without losing their legitimacy, at least sometimes diverge from the
conception of human ﬂourishing held by those to whom they apply. This
is the real reason why rights can have content-independent value that
allows them to trump other considerations. As importantly, this means
that legal rights can legitimately impose costs on individual and social
moral autonomy. Those costs are always present in contemporary states,
characterized as these are by religious and cultural pluralism. But they can
be offset by the countervailing beneﬁts ﬂowing from the existence of a
legal system and of the society it upholds. As a class, legal rights are indeed
costly and beneﬁcial irrespective of their content, but Dworkin wrongly
conﬂates the institution of rights with the legal institutionalization of
rights.
The identiﬁcation of the true cost and beneﬁts of legal rights brings us
back to the conclusions reached in the previous two sections. If, as I
argued, equality of concern and respect is not capable of resolving
pervasive and frequent conﬂicts between rights and collective interests,
and if a legal system that is committed to pluralism and tolerance is
inevitably confronted with conﬂicts between incommensurable ethical
demands, then the legal system must decide which conception(s) of
human ﬂourishing are to prevail in the event of a conﬂict. This is why the
true cost of legal rights lies in their incarnation as legal.
The conclusions reached so far direct attention to the legitimacy of
decisions by legal institutions that give effect to a speciﬁc vision of human
ﬂourishing. This depends on whether there is good reason for allowing
legal institutions to make such determinations even when this constrains
moral autonomy. Does the existence of the legal system in itself provide
sufficient beneﬁts to justify this kind of choice? And is the vision of
human ﬂourishing that is given effect to by the legal system a genuine
conception of what it is to lead a worthwhile human life?
The answer to both questions lies, I believe, in whether a legal system
maintains and indeed promotes pluralism and tolerance. As this is a
widely-held view that is shared by Dworkin I will not defend it here.
Rather, I wish to draw attention to the fact that we have reached this
conclusion despite discarding Dworkin’s idea that rights are intrinsically
linked to equality of concern and respect. This is important, for it enables
us to adopt a different and more convincing account of how rights trump,
that is, a different explanation and defence of the limitation of rights.
IV BALANCING DEFENDED
Once it is accepted that legal rights and their application inevitably
endorse a vision of human ﬂourishing and that this can be legitimate
despite imposing a cost on moral autonomy, it is clear that rights may
only be limited in a manner that is, ﬁrst, coherent with the vision(s) of a
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worthwhile human life that is (are) reﬂected in that legal system, and,
secondly, achieves the right balance between the advantages brought by
the legal system and the cost that it imposes on autonomy. Does the
balancing of rights by way of a proportionality test satisfy these
requirements?
A charter of fundamental rights contains a legal system’s most basic
vision of what is required for the leading of a worthwhile human life in
the state in which it applies. The ﬁrst issue can therefore be explored by
investigating whether the balancing of rights is consistent with ﬁdelity to
such a system of rights.
As a ﬁrst step, we must note, as Alexy does, that the rights speciﬁed in
such charters are the product of decisions about how competing values
(or pre-legal rights) should be balanced, but are incomplete decisions.66
For example, if, as in South Africa, there is a constitutional right to an
environment that is not detrimental to health and well-being,67 then this
means that the constitution contains inter alia the decision that attention
to environmental protection is not optional in that society. To treat
environmental protection as something that could be wholly left out of
account would amount to a failure to take this constitutional right
seriously. But the decision encapsulated in the right is plainly an
incomplete decision because the speciﬁcation of the right fails to tell us
whether this means that not the slightest impact on health and well-being
is permitted, or whether there is a certain threshold below which
environmental impacts are permissible. Because the speciﬁed right
contains no decision on this, setting such a level would not fail to take the
right seriously; to the contrary, it would constitute an application thereof.
The existence of a constitutional right excludes only the re-consideration
by a court of the question that underlies the right, eg whether there
should be a constitutional right to an environment that is not detrimental
to health and well-being. Considerations militating against the existence
of the right may not be considered if the right is taken seriously, but other
issues, those not underlying the decision whether to recognize the right,
are not excluded.
Of course it must be borne in mind that the reach of this exclusionary
effect of a right will vary along with the range of issues the resolution of
which underlies the enactment of the right. But it is a universal feature of
fundamental constitutional rights that they are always to some extent
incomplete stipulations.68
66 See the text above following note 8.
67 Section 24 of the Constitution (n 2).
68 See the text above to note 8. This means that the exclusionary effect of particular
constitutional rights will vary along with the precision or concreteness of the formulation of
right – the more general the formulation of the right, the less it excludes, and vice versa.
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This brings us to the second step. Here it is useful to draw on Alexy’s
analysis of the balancing of rights, according to which the application of
the proportionality test involves treating a right as (in part) an
‘optimization requirement’, a value that must be given effect to the
greatest extent possible within the context, both legal and factual, in
which it is to be applied.69 Now, one can distinguish between two ways
in which a constitutional right to a healthy environment can be measured
against other considerations. First, we might treat the instruction that the
environment must be protected in this way, ie the right itself, as a value to
be balanced against others, for example economic development, so that
on occasion this instruction, though applicable, would not be given effect
to since doing so would defeat a more important goal. Secondly, we
might treat the right as an optimization requirement stipulating complete
protection against any impact whatsoever as the aim that is to be balanced
against others. Then the focus would fall on the level of protection that is
achievable in the given factual and legal context, so that on occasion the
conclusion would be reached that application of the right does not
require complete protection against all possible impacts on the interest it
enshrines. Here it is not the right itself that is measured against a
countervailing consideration, but only its full realization.70While the ﬁrst
way would indeed fail to take this right seriously, the same cannot be said
of the second way, which applies, rather than fails to apply, the right.
Balancing rights by means of the proportionality test follows the
second way rather than the ﬁrst. This is so because applying the
proportionality test does not come to an end with the determination of
the relative importance of clashing considerations, but also requires that
the less important must still be given effect to the extent that this is
compatible with the more important consideration. This means that the
proportionality test does not balance the right itself against countervailing
rights or non-right goals, but rather balances the full realization of the
right against such considerations. This provides the answer to the ﬁrst
issue, for it shows that the balancing of rights is consistent with ﬁdelity to
a charter of rights.
The second issue is whether the proportionality test achieves the right
balance between the advantages brought by the legal system and the cost
that it imposes on moral autonomy. The speciﬁc beneﬁts brought by a
particular legal system may, as was implied above, take a variety of forms,
but they all derive in some way or other from the service performed by
69 See note 9.
70 This is what South Africa’s Constitutional Court seems to have done when it was
confronted in Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association 2001 (3) SA
1151 (CC) with a conﬂict between this right and the government’s efforts to provide
emergency shelter to people rendered homeless by a ﬂood.
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the legal system in constituting and maintaining a given society. If, for
example, the cost imposed on moral autonomy is made worthwhile by
the fact that those who are made to bear this cost share in a level of
material welfare that facilitates the (admittedly restricted) pursuit of their
vision of the good life, then this beneﬁt derives from their membership in
a society that pursues a vision of human ﬂourishing that produces this
beneﬁt, and hence from the support given to that vision by the legal
system.We have just seen how the proportionality test serves to maintain
such a vision.
But can this beneﬁt ever outweigh the cost paid for it? It seems
plausible to think that this feature of the proportionality test turns those
who pay the cost into second-class citizens, for they appear condemned
to leading lives that are only partly autonomous. Does its ﬁdelity to the
charter of rights not mean that the proportionality test fails to maintain
the right balance between this cost and beneﬁt?
The answer to this is that the proportionality test ensures that the legal
system remains open to the fullest extent that is compatible with the
existence of the society constituted thereby. This test is premised on the
twin ideas that there may be legitimate social goals that fall outside the
charter of rights and that the concrete impact of fundamental rights must
vary along with the range of such goals with which they come into
contact. The practical effect of the proportionality test is therefore that
changing social values and goals can alter what ﬁdelity to the charter of
rights requires. This means that the autonomy cost is not locked in by the
proportionality test, but that this test to the contrary allows that cost to be
reduced, redistributed, or even eliminated. To give but one example: the
proportionality test in principle makes it possible to reduce the cost that
Muslim girls who are committed to wearing headscarves in state schools
may have to pay for living in an affluent European society, because the
practical effect of the right to religious freedom will shift as social goals
shift from secularism to multiculturalism.
Of course it is not part of my claim that the proportionality test
guarantees such results. What actually happens will depend on how social
goals change and on how sensitive legal institutions such as courts and
legislatures are to these changes. The point is that because the
proportionality test allows such results it does not lock people into a rigid
framework of law. This does not mean that it allows absolute ﬂexibility.
That would be incompatible with continued ﬁdelity to the constitutional
charter of rights. But absolute ﬂexibility takes us out of the realm of the
application of law and hence of the proportionality test, for it amounts to
changing or replacing the constitution. The proportionality test does not
promise that, but it makes no sense to criticize a leopard for its inability to
ﬂy.
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It should be evident from what has been said in this section that the
proportionality test takes seriously the fact that it is their incarnation as
legal that results in the costs and beneﬁts of rights. Its general aim and
function is to mediate between these costs and beneﬁts, recognizing all
the while that it is a forlorn hope that legal systems can be neutral about
the conditions of human ﬂourishing. Although not necessary for my
argument, and therefore not a point I wish to pursue here, one could
argue that it is a virtue of this test that it sees the legal system as taking
responsibility for the ethical quality of its citizen’s lives, not merely their
equality as rational beings. As Finnis puts it, ‘the objective of justice is not
equality, but the common good, the ﬂourishing of all members of
society’.71
V CONCLUSION
The debate between Alexy and Habermas with which this essay started
raises two issues that are of general interest. Does the balancing of rights
by way of a proportionality test take the character of constitutional rights
as rights seriously? And can it yield results that are rational and defensible,
thus, in principle, making it legitimate for courts to undertake this task?
Or is it better to rank rights against each other and against values not
enshrined in constitutional rights?
Dworkin’s theory of rights as trumps is perhaps the best-known
account of the ranking of rights. It treats rights as having a special
relationship with what justice demands of social institutions, which, in
his view, is that all citizens are to be treated with equal concern and
respect. This relationship is presented as content independent and as
marking rights off from non-right social values and goals in a manner that
endows all rights with prima facie authority over such other values and
goals. But, I have argued, equality of concern and respect does not
establish a content-independent distinction between rights and values
that are not endowed with the status of rights. It is an inappropriate
criterion of social justice, and dissolves rather than supports the deontic
character of rights.
But constitutional rights plainly do trump other considerations. Is
there an alternative explanation for this? I believe that there is, and have
argued that it lies in recognizing the variety of services that legal systems
provide and the wedge that this drives between the legitimacy of law and
the equal protection of the moral autonomy of citizens. Since it is their
legal character that accounts for this content-independent cost and
beneﬁt of constitutional rights, their relationship with non-right consid-
71 John Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) 174.
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erations is governed by the need to maximise those beneﬁts through
upholding the vision of human ﬂourishing enshrined in those rights.
The weaknesses in the ideal of equality of concern and respect make it
tempting to think that this would lock society into the vision that courts
extract from such rights. That would give substance to the fear of many
that constitutional charters of rights turn judges into philosopher-kings.
For, as Dworkin has consistently reminded us, the moral terms in which
such rights are couched demands from judges a moral reading of the
constitution that inevitably engages their own moral views which are
likely to differ from those held by at least some citizens.72
That would indeed be the result if we were to substitute Dworkin’s
ranking exercise by another, which would use such a vision of human
ﬂourishing as a metric for the comparison of rights and other consider-
ations. But a balancing exercise, which discards the search for such a
metric and instead seeks to optimize rights and values to the greatest
extent possible, avoids that result. It protects, at least in principle, the
interests of those whose ethical commitments diverge from the one
extracted by judges from the constitution, by allowing the maximum
ﬂexibility compatible with the continued existence of the legal system
and society founded on the constitution.
Whether it does so in practice depends, of course, on how the courts
employ the proportionality test when balancing rights with other rights
and with non-right considerations. It is here that the abstract discussion
in this essay has some practical implications of a general nature. On the
one hand it shows that judges must be wary of focusing their attention to
such an extent on avoiding rights conﬂicts through the restrictive
interpretation of rights that the proportionality test becomes of little
practical relevance. Such an approach enhances the risks attached to the
inescapably moral reading of a constitution and threatens the beneﬁts
attendant on balancing rather than ranking. On the other hand it also
points to the importance of avoiding the opposite extreme in which
rights are endowed with such a wide reach that conﬂicts of the type
discussed here occur so frequently that the proportionality test is engaged
in virtually every case. This also threatens the beneﬁts ﬂowing from
balancing, as its impact on the distribution of ﬁnal decision-making
power between the courts and the legislature might well put the
advantages that a society provides to its members in jeopardy: courts are
not always best at striking the right balance.
72 Freedom’s Law (n 20) Introduction.
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